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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY - DO WE HAVE IT RIGHT?** 

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DOUGLAS J. KOSKI, JR. United States Air Force

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# USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

# COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY - DO WE HAVE IT RIGHT?

by

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U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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# **ABSTRACT**

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This paper focuses on current U.S. counterterrorism policy and examines its effectiveness in light of the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. The paper begins with a brief history of the origins of terrorism, followed by an explanation of the reasons for current animosity in the Islamic World (and particularly in the Middle East) toward the U.S. It describes the objectives of the global terror network (Al Qaeda) and the available resources with which it is attempting to achieve those goals. After a short discussion on how the U.S arrived at current policy over the past 35 years, the paper analyzes whether the policy is adequate or needs to be modified. Three policy options are explored: tougher stance; more moderated approach; and status quo. The assessment determines that current U.S. policy is sound, but more resolute implementation of the policy (with more financial resources) is required. Finally, the paper evaluates the current (post September 11) environment and recommends implementation of specific ways and means to achieve victory in the war on terrorism.

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# COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY - DO WE HAVE IT RIGHT?

The subject of terrorism currently dominates the media and is the primary focus of American public and private discourse as a result of the attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. The Bush administration clearly has a mandate from the American people to continue taking military action against those who perpetrated or were complicit in an act which killed 3000 people, mostly American civilians. Meeting this mandate requires implementation of counterterrorism, a concept which is generally defined as offensive measures to preempt terrorist activity, as opposed to anti-terrorism, which includes defensive measures such as force protection, homeland defense, and responses to mitigate damage following terrorist attacks. Although both offensive and defensive measures are obviously required, this paper will describe current national security policy as it applies to counterterrorism, including the use of military forces. The paper then analyzes alternatives and makes recommendations for reacting to the tragic events of 11 September 2001.

# TERRORISM – THE WEAPON OF THE WEAK

Much has been written, and there is much debate, on the origins and meaning of terrorism. A useful chronology in the <u>Historical Dictionary of Terrorism<sup>1</sup></u>, identifies the Jewish nationalist Zealot (Sicarii) movement as the first documented terrorist organization in A.D. 66. This group was religiously motivated, embraced martyrdom, and used short swords to anonymously kill people in large crowds in broad daylight.<sup>2</sup> Their objective of removing the Roman Empire led to mass insurrections in the province of Judea; the Roman destruction of Jerusalem; and the mass suicide of the Zealots when they were besieged at Masada in A.D. 70.<sup>3</sup> The next entry in the chronology occurs over 1000 years later, and describes the Ismaili Fedayeen cult of "assassins," who were also religiously motivated and were also eventually exterminated. The term "terrorist" first appeared during the French Revolution and was described as "anyone who attempted to further his views by a system of coercive intimidation. It is interesting to note that the term "terrorist" was first applied not to a small group of people attempting to overthrow a government, but to the Revolutionary French government of 1793-1794.

Terror organizations in modern times have been categorized as state (acting against their own people with the goal of regime maintenance); revolutionary (acting to overthrow a regime to

establish a new regime); or entrepreneurial (acting autonomously from any existing nation-state or would-be nation-state with objectives other than regime change or maintenance).<sup>8</sup>

State terrorism has probably killed more people than revolutionary or entrepreneurial terrorism (witness the Nazi and Stalin regimes of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, for example). However, in today's environment states do not openly practice terrorism, preferring instead to sponsor and assist non-governmental organizations. Revolutionary and entrepreneurial terrorists dominate the current world scene and are the focus of U.S. foreign policy.

Today's terrorists inflict terror because it is the only strategy/tool they see as effective in achieving their goals. They cannot employ direct diplomatic or military means to get what they want, so they resort to the only other means available...the "weapon of the weak." Such organizations obviously do not call themselves terrorists, but refer to themselves as freedom fighters, guerillas, or some other term that casts them in a more favorable light, while possibly referring to their adversaries as terrorists. This is one of the reasons for the difficulty in gaining consensus on a definition for terrorism and leads to the question, "Who are the real terrorists? How do we tell the difference between them and freedom fighters?" The Historical Dictionary of Terrorism offers one explanation that seems appropriate in the context of the current international environment:

"The approach in this dictionary has been to regard as terrorists those groups that will ordinarily attack noncombatants or nonmilitary targets as freely as military targets....The specific quality defining terrorism is that it seeks deliberately to create terror in others who are the "audience" of the terrorists. Terrorists seek to force their "audience" to pay them attention and to respond in some manner."

The attacks on the World Trade Center clearly fall under this definition of terrorist activity. But what are the objectives of the perpetrators (presumably Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda organization)? Do they want to overthrow all the Western leaning (colonially established) governments in the Middle East (including Israel and Saudi Arabia), or do they simply want to see U.S. military forces withdrawn from the region and the establishment of a Palestinian homeland? Why do they hate the United States? What is the size and extent of their support base? Successful policy should be based on the answers to these questions.

### WHY DO THEY HATE US?

Radical Islamic fundamentalists justify their violence based on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. First on the list of grievances is American support for Israel: politically in the United Nations; economically (\$840 million in aid annually); and militarily (\$3 billion annually plus access to U.S. weapons). Arab animosity towards Israel goes back to 1948, when as

part of the U.N. partitioning of the land between the Mediterranean and the River Jordan, Israel was given nation-state status on land which the Arab world considers to be part of its holy land. In the ensuing war between Israel and five Arab armies, Israel conquered additional land not partitioned to it by the U.N., and thousands of Palestinians became refugees.<sup>11</sup>

In addition to U.S. support of Israel, radical Islamic fundamentalists encourage hatred by playing on the feelings of many moderates that Western presence and influence in the land of Muhammad is a sacrilege. American support for the very corrupt Shah of Iran until his fall in 1979, our military presence in Saudi Arabia beginning with the Gulf War in 1990, and U.S. sanctions against Iraq for the past decade (causing the deaths of an estimated 5,000 Iraqi children per month), <sup>12</sup> all add to the image Osama bin Laden portrays of the U.S. as the "Great Satan," supporting Israel (the "Little Satan"), at the expense of innocent Muslims. <sup>13</sup>

# WHAT IS THEIR SUPPORT BASE?

Extremist Islamic terrorists enjoy broad moral support throughout the world, via the public and private approval of moderate Muslims. An article in the October 2001 edition of <u>Time</u> magazine described the situation as follows:

"Animosity toward the U.S. in the Middle East can be plotted through concentric circles. In the white-hot core are violent ideologues like bin Laden and their acolytes. Then come Arab radicals, including both Islamic fundamentalists and secular nationalists, who are desperate and angry enough to have danced in the streets upon hearing the news of Sept. 11 (this group is also ripe for recruitment into terrorist organizations). But the distaste also extends to large numbers of temperate Arabs who were quietly pleased to see American arrogance taken down a notch...who smiled and sent messages of congratulations to one another when the Twin Towers fell."

In addition to moral support, funding for terrorist activities is also robust. Osama bin Laden's personal fortune, in addition to cash contributions from worldwide "charitable" organizations, drug trafficking and organized crime, all provide substantial resources needed to execute operations. Since the money is transferred in small amounts (less than \$10,000) and spread over many bank accounts in many countries, the money is extremely difficult to track.<sup>15</sup>

Finally, terrorists receive safe haven, sponsorship, and tacit approval for their actions from nation-state sponsors. The United States Department of State, through extensive research, publishes an annual list of known state sponsors, which currently includes the countries of Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. The Taliban of Afghanistan (supporters of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda) are not on this list because the Taliban are not internationally recognized as constituting the sovereign government of Afghanistan.

Nonetheless, the territory of Afghanistan is well established and recognized as a fertile safe haven and training ground for the Al Qaeda organization.

# **CURRENT POLICY AND THE CHANGING TERRORIST THREAT**

President Clinton's December 2000 National Security Strategy states, "When terrorism occurs, despite our best efforts, we can neither forget the crime nor ever give up on bringing its perpetrators to justice.... As long as terrorists continue to target American citizens, we reserve the right to act in self-defense by striking at their bases and those who sponsor, assist, or actively support them...."

Although President Bush has not yet published a new National Security Strategy, his address to the Congress and the American people on 20 September 2001 echoed these same sentiments. He issued specific demands to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan; indicated these demands were not open to negotiation; and reiterated longstanding policy when he said, "We will direct every resource at our command — every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war — to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network." 18

American policy over the past 30 years has become increasingly offensive in nature. In the late 1960s, official U.S. policy was not to give in to terrorist demands, but concessions seem to have been more acceptable if they led to the release of hostages. For example, in January 1973, the U.S. ambassador to Haiti was kidnapped. After local authorities made some concessions to the kidnappers, the ambassador was released. Worldwide, aircraft highjackings peaked in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as terrorists achieved some measure of success using this form of coercion. On 29 October 1972, Lebanese terrorists highjacked Lufthansa Flight 615 en route from Beirut to Munich and successfully secured the release of the three surviving members of the team that had massacred 11 Israelis at the 1972 Olympic games in Munich on 5 September 1972. On 10 September 1976, a TWA flight from New York to Chicago was highjacked by Croation Nationalists, who diverted the plane to Newfoundland, Iceland, and Paris. Their demands included the dropping of leaflets over London, Montreal, and Paris, and publication of a communiqué in major newspapers. Their demands were met, and all the hostages and crew were released unharmed.<sup>21</sup>

In 1973, two policy changes dramatically reduced the frequency of terrorist skyjackings. In January of that year, luggage inspection and full screening of boarding passengers was instituted at all U.S. airports. The number of skyjackings in 1973 was half the number in 1972 and has declined further since then.<sup>22</sup> Also, President Nixon significantly hardened the wording

of official U.S. policy by specifically refusing to negotiate for the release of hostages or pay ransoms, and by refusing to release terrorists already in prison. The Reagan administration in 1982 expanded on this policy by including the use of all political, military, and economic means possible to combat terrorism, and for the first time included state sponsors of terrorism as viable targets.<sup>23</sup> This policy is essentially unchanged today, as President Bush, since the events of 11 September 2001, has repeatedly emphasized the use of all the instruments of national power to combat terrorism worldwide.

The U.S. State Department has also published four main tenets of policy regarding counterterrorism:

"First, make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals. Second, bring terrorists to justice for their crimes. Third, isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior. Fourth, bolster the counterterrorist capabilities of those countries that work with the United States and require assistance." <sup>24</sup>

The flexibility of terrorists in the past decade has been demonstrated in their ability to change their tactics based on evolving policy within the U.S. and throughout the world. The tightening of airport security and refusal to negotiate with highjackers has reduced the number of incidents but has led various terrorist organizations to resort to more lethal means, in the form of bombings, such as the attack against U.S. military personnel at the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia; attacks on our embassies in Africa; the USS Cole in Yemen; and most recently the World Trade Center and Pentagon. While the number of incidents per year is about one-half what it was in the early 1980s, the number of injuries and deaths rose from about 6,000 in 1980 to 18,000 in 1999.<sup>25</sup>

A second, more alarming development over the past decade has been the hesitance of terrorist groups to claim public responsibility for their actions. Examples include the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1983, the bombing of a Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires in 1994, the Tokyo subway attack in 1995, and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. Most recently, the attacks on the USS Cole, the World Trade Center, and the Pentagon were not accompanied by specific claims of responsibility, nor were there any long diatribes from terrorists attempting to justify their actions in the media. This lends credence to the theory that terrorism is becoming not so much a tool to achieve some political objective, but an end in itself, such as serving God or simply the satisfaction that one has struck a blow against the "hated enemy." The difficulties this creates for a democratic government are evident: first, we must investigate and acquire evidence on our own before we can assign responsibility to individuals or organizations; second, without concrete evidence it is dangerous to use any form of national

power to retaliate. To the United States' credit, this country has not since 11 September 2001 implemented sanctions nor initiated military operations against any individual or organization without evidence that would stand the scrutiny of our court system and the international community.

### **ALTERNATIVES**

Alternative policies for combating terrorism have been categorized in a variety of ways for the purpose of analysis. According to Schmid and Crelinsten<sup>28</sup>, "soft" policy favors conciliatory measures, such as accommodation, to include negotiating with terrorists, or reform measures that address terrorists' agendas without direct negotiation. Also included in the "soft" category is the strategy of using the media to challenge the concept of terrorism as a legitimate method for redressing grievances. In contrast, "hard" policy favors repressive measures, either through a criminal justice model (find, arrest, convict, and punish terrorists in accordance with established legal systems), or through a war model (military force). Western governments have implemented various combinations of these policies since the late 1960s. The Iran-Contra Affair of the Reagan administration is just one example of U.S. secretive soft policy coinciding with public rhetoric to the contrary.<sup>29</sup>

Assuming that the U.S. will continue to adopt a combination of these strategies and in light of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, three alternatives for counterterrorism policy become apparent: (1) take a tougher stance; (2) take a softer stance; (3) maintain current policy.

### **ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES**

During his term as President, Ronald Reagan openly espoused the logic of adopting terrorist methods to fight terrorists.<sup>30</sup> This approach is one of several ways the United States might implement tougher counterterrorism policies. Certainly increased military force would have the effect of disrupting terrorist operations and would delay or inhibit future terrorist strikes. Military options currently have the full support of the American people, who compare the events of 11 September to Pearl Harbor. Traditional U.S. allies have publicly supported military attacks against targets in Afghanistan. Military successes might help galvanize world opinion and lead to greater international cooperation in neutralizing terror organizations.

The disadvantages of military operations center on issues relating to national values, legality, and potential escalation of terrorist events in response to military actions. It is contrary to democratic values to kill people without a fair trial unless they are soldiers in a declared war. American values, expressed in our laws, require criminals to be captured (with the least amount

of force possible) and afforded due process of law. The second part to this argument makes the claim that military action is not an effective deterrent. Statistical analysis of terrorist acts following the 1986 U.S. bombing of Libya (one of many examples) indicated no change in the frequency of terrorist attacks on U.S. interests following the use of military force. A counter to this argument would posit that Muammar Qhaddafi has kept a low profile since then and has not been known to sponsor subsequent terrorist attacks. He also eventually cooperated with the international community and extradited two Libyan officials indicted in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 on 21 November 1988, supporting a theory that direct military action has deterred Libya from further terrorist acts. The more plausible explanation, however, is that Qhaddafi has become more savvy and patient in his actions, providing safe haven and sponsorship to other terrorist organizations, and refraining from public claims of responsibility for terrorist acts, while pursuing chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs and refusing international inspection of his facilities. The experience of Israel is also worth noting here. Their policy of retribution against all terrorist events has not had any visible effect on the frequency or lethality with which attacks have occurred in that country.

The second policy option, a softened response to terrorism, has advantages and disadvantages strikingly similar to the hard-line position. Negotiating with terrorists would probably reduce terrorist activity in the short run. By addressing grievances, the government could make significant strides toward de-legitimizing the avowed purpose of the violence, and public opinion would be swayed against any organization that executed future events. Winning the hearts and minds of moderate Arabs who would condone terrorism could have a significant deterrent effect in Al Qaeda's ability to recruit new members. However, statistics once again demonstrate that concessions generally encourage terrorists to continue targeting those who made the deals, and worse, the public might perceive the government as weak and unable to protect its citizens.<sup>33</sup> In 1986, elements in the Reagan White House negotiated with Iranian-controlled terrorists in Lebanon to release American hostages in exchange for shipment of American weapons to Iran. The deal had been one shipment of arms for each hostage released, but during the time that three shipments were made and three hostages released, the terrorists abducted an additional three hostages.<sup>34</sup> This example points to the inevitable futility of negotiating with terrorists.

The third course of action (maintaining current policy) appears to be the best solution. President Bush appropriately indicated on 20 September 2001 that all U.S. instruments of power would be used against the global terrorist network. This policy has the multiple advantages of reassuring the American people and our allies; serving notice to terrorists and

those who harbor them; and encouraging international cooperation as the State Department works to build international solidarity against the concept of illegal violence against innocents.

# ASSESSMENT AND ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT

If current policy is sound, the next step is to determine the best ways and means to implement that policy. The events of 11 September 2001 were the most recent in a series of attacks in the past decade that indicate we must commit more resources toward proactive implementation of our policies. In other words, policy without committed resources becomes mere rhetoric, and the fact that the World Trade Center no longer exists in New York is a clear indication that we need to implement policy more aggressively. Policy implementation involves developing specific courses of action based on assessment of the current environment and assumptions regarding our adversaries' goals and future courses of action. Based on those assumptions we can develop our own courses of action for implementing our substantial instruments of national power to defeat them.

Based on comments by Osama bin Laden, revealed in a video tape to the world on 8 October 2001, it is apparent that Al Qaeda has more terrorist attacks planned against the United States.<sup>35</sup> It is also safe to assume that as long as the United States is actively engaged diplomatically and with military forces in the Middle East, and as long as American policy supports Israel and the issue of a Palestinian homeland is not settled, radical Islamic fundamentalists will attempt to commit terrorist acts against American citizens, preferably within the United States itself to kill as many Americans as possible. The Al Qaeda network headed by Mr. bin Laden has global reach, significant financial resources, and a seemingly limitless supply of young Muslims who are willing to sacrifice their lives for a cause they believe to be a holy obligation.<sup>36</sup> In short, their strategic objective is to remove the physical presence as well as the political influence of the "Big Satan" from the holy lands of the Middle East.

Osama bin Laden's rhetoric has evolved in the past five years. In his original "Declaration of War" in October 1996, he described the enemy only as "U.S. soldiers;" in February 1998 he took a more hard-line position and called for attacks on Americans "wherever they can be found;" and in a January 1999 interview with <u>Time</u> magazine he said, "If the majority of the American people support their dissolute president, this means the American people are fighting us and we have a right to target them. Any American who pays taxes to his government is our target because he is helping the American war machine against the Muslim nation." 37

Not only is it reasonable to assume more attacks have been planned and will continue to be planned, it is probable that radical Islamic terrorists will continue to use weapons of mass destruction to kill as many Americans as possible. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon employed conventional means but caused mass destruction. Although chemical, biological, and nuclear means have not as yet been attributed to Al Qaeda, we must assume that these weapons will be employed by any organization with access to them and the desire to cause mass casualties. Osama bin Laden has been actively seeking weapons of mass destruction with his considerable financial resources for at least eight years, <sup>38</sup> and he may now have possession of materials with which to build a radiological dispersal device, <sup>39</sup> commonly referred to as a "dirty bomb."

In addition to assumptions we make on the part of our enemies, we must also make assumptions about the political environment and support for our actions both within the United States and with foreign allies and coalition partners. At this time the environment is particularly conducive to the use of all instruments of national power against terrorists, specifically Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Although public and international support is always tenable when it comes to military engagements, sanctions, and the freezing of financial assets, it is safe to assume that the enormity of the events of 11 September 2001 will ensure support for American leadership in the war against terrorism for at least a few years. Additional terrorist attacks on American soil would probably further galvanize public support. Osama bin Laden has awakened the "sleeping giant" which is national will on the part of the American people. As for the international community, the post Persian Gulf War experience is probably most instructive. The United States can rely on democratic Western governments for continuing full support, but predominantly Arab and developing nations will likely balk at some point in the next several months as the situation in Afghanistan stabilizes. This will be a serious policy test for the Bush administration, who has vowed that the war on terrorism will extend beyond Afghanistan to all states who sponsor or even passively condone terrorism by allowing organizations to operate within their territories. The decision on where to focus instruments of national power, after Afghanistan stabilizes, should be carefully considered. There is already significant sentiment in the Arab world that the U.S. is focusing on killing Muslims while turning a blind eye to violence committed by the Israelis, as well as non-Muslim terrorist organizations worldwide. This leads to the common belief among moderate Arabs that the U.S. is interested only in Israel and Middle East oil, not the suffering of starving children in Iraq and elsewhere.

There are at least two types of scenarios which would serve to dilute support for offensive actions against terrorists. First, if there are no further actions against American civilians, the American public could easily be diverted to domestic political issues and lose interest in international events. Second, if American military casualties overseas mount to large numbers

with no observable progress for a few years (ala Vietnam), U.S. policy makers might have a difficult time convincing the public that military actions overseas are in the interest of national security. However, both of these scenarios present extreme difficulties for terrorists. If they carry out attacks against American civilians, public opinion will be galvanized against them, and the United States will act unilaterally if necessary in response to direct attacks against our sovereign territory, invoking Article 5 of the U.N. charter. If terrorists target military forces overseas, they target American strength, not weakness, and the likelihood of success is greatly diminished. If they discontinue attempts to target Americans, their "raison d'etere" as terrorists evaporates. The logical conclusion here is that as long as Al Qaeda targets American citizens, policy makers can count on the "sleeping giant" to stay awake.

The foregoing assumptions can be summarized as follows: radical Islamic terrorists will continue to attempt attacks against Americans as long as they have the wherewithal to do so; they will use any and all resources they can acquire, including weapons of mass destruction, to inflict as many deaths as possible; American national security interests will keep this country engaged in the Middle East for the foreseeable future; and the United States will respond with all its formidable instruments of national power, with considerable public approval, regardless of international support, as long as terrorists continue to target American civilians.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the current environment and the assumptions outlined above, it remains for us to determine the appropriate ways and means to implement the policy. Ways and means should be manifested in recommended courses of action, which describe specifically what needs to be done, and just as importantly, what should not be done.

First, Congress should continue on its current path of authorizing military troops to fight the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Combat troops are appropriate means to arrest Afghan human suffering and disrupt or destroy proven sources of a clear and present danger to this and other countries. Much has been written on asymmetric warfare as an advantage for terrorists, but we should not hesitate, where appropriate, to use the asymmetric advantage the United States possesses, which is the best trained, best equipped, most powerful combat force in the world.<sup>40</sup>

Second, special care should be taken to minimize civilian casualties among the Afghan people. The measures we take to do so should be highly publicized as conforming to our national values and to mitigate the unavoidable fact that Islamic extremists will recruit new people by highlighting civilian casualties which will inevitably occur. The delivery of food, along

with bombs on targets, to the same country beginning on October 7, 2001, without a war declaration, demonstrated appropriate use of our considerable ways and means.

The United States needs to do everything in its power to avoid the perception among moderate Muslims that we are engaged in a war against Islam. Dr. Sami G. Hajjar of the United States Army War College's Department of National Security and Strategy makes a convincing argument that, first, it is impossible to prevent extremists from declaring violent "jihad" against the United States. 41 Second, the use of military force is necessary to avenge American deaths suffered on 11 September 2001 and to deter extremists from committing future acts of terrorism.<sup>42</sup> Third, the United States should focus on working with coalition partners to discredit those who declare violent "jihad," because they do not have the authority to do so, and the type of violence they advocate is inconsistent with the teachings of the Qur'an. 43 Finally, although there is a strong temptation to target "affiliates" of Al Qaeda such as Hamas and Hizbollah, as well as their state sponsors, many Arabs and Muslims consider these organizations to be engaged in legitimate self defense and national liberation efforts. To use military force against them at this time, without direct proof that they were involved in the events of 11 September 2001, would present the impression that the United States is waging war against Islam, and moderate Islamic clerics would likely begin to issue their own calls to "jihad." <sup>44</sup> Although U.S. military force in Afghanistan currently has international support, the other elements of national power should be highlighted and implemented in the coming months to avoid a global holy war.

In order to avoid holy war we should enlist the aid of moderate Muslim clerics and the media worldwide to publicize the fact that terrorism is not consistent with the teachings of the Qur'an. There are also strong indications that Iran is beginning to adopt democratic ideals of liberty within the framework of Islamic fundamentalism. The U.S. has a unique opportunity to capitalize on this situation by ameliorating its relationship with Iran, who has openly opposed terrorism but also opposes Western presence and unilateral combat operations in the Middle East. To further this objective, the United States should work with the Saudi government to develop a joint statement, loudly declaring to the United Nations that U.S. military forces will be removed from Saudi Arabia as soon as the Palestinian homeland issue is settled and Islamic extremist terrorist attacks on U.S. citizens have ceased for five consecutive years. The U.S. military has been in Saudi Arabia since the end of the Persian Gulf War, at the invitation of the Saudi monarchy, for two primary reasons: to enforce the no-fly zone in southern Iraq thereby deterring Saddam Hussein from further aggression in the region; and to ensure the unimpeded flow of Persian Gulf oil to the rest of the world. Asia and Europe are more dependent on Gulf oil than is the United States, and the economies of most countries in the world, including the Arab

countries, would be seriously crippled without access to this vital resource. A commitment to leave Saudi Arabia under the right conditions would help to address the concern of moderate Arabs that Western ways are negatively influencing their holy land and their culture. Such a commitment would also de-legitimize terrorist attacks and calls to violent "jihad" to rid the holy land of the infidels. Finally, U.S. and Saudi solidarity in a plan to remove combat troops could add leverage to our attempts to resolve the issue of a Palestinian homeland.

The United States has for some time advocated a Palestinian homeland, but terrorist violence escalates every time overtures are made toward peace talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians. If moderate Palestinians believe there is a realistic opportunity to resolve this issue, they will take care of the terrorists in their neighborhoods themselves. This idea flows from the advice offered by Dr. Stephen Biddle of the United States Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute. Dr. Biddle argues that the war we are fighting is not against terrorism, but against Al Qaeda's radical ideology, which "seeks to preserve a puritanical, strictly fundamentalist Islam by isolating it from the destructive influences of modern, and especially Western, culture."47 However, as Dr. Biddle points out, global communications, international broadcasting, and growing cultural interpenetration make it impossible for the Arab Islamic world to totally isolate itself from outside influence. Second, Al Qaeda's ideology is based on violence and does not distinguish between civilians and military troops as legitimate targets for this violence. 48 Our challenge, therefore, is to convince moderate Arab Muslims that the ideology of Al Qaeda is not only flawed but doomed to failure. If we defeat their ideology, we will indeed see Palestinians turning against those in their midst who would commit wanton acts of terrorism. Ameliorating our relations with Iran, enlisting the aid of moderate clerics at home and abroad. and publicly committing to withdrawing from Saudi Arabia, will do more to defeat terrorism than all the divisions, carriers, and fighter aircraft in our inventory.

In the meantime, however, we must remain prepared to use military force where appropriate. Al Qaeda forces are currently robust and spread worldwide. Weapons of Mass Destruction pose the most dangerous threat to American lives and property. The United States and the international community must impose tougher economic and military sanctions on those who supply these weapons, along with the associated technology, to terrorists and terrorist states. In 1995, former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called for the United States to lead the world in preventing the proliferation of nuclear technology and fissionable materials, <sup>49</sup> but the avowed willingness of terrorists to use chemical and biological agents, and the anthrax-related deaths of Americans since 11 September 2001, clearly indicate these types of weapons must be aggressively sanctioned as well.

Imposing sanctions is easy to declare but difficult to implement. Only through international cooperation and a much broader sharing of intelligence can we identify the buyers and suppliers of these weapons. Once again, in the intelligence arena, the United States must take the lead in sharing information with our allies and coalition partners in order to gain their trust and confidence. Increased border security and Coast Guard inspections are good defensive measures, but they can not be expected to stop repeated, determined attempts to introduce these types of weapons into this country. The United States should at least double the budgets of those agencies involved with the collection and analysis of signals intelligence information, and triple the budgets of those involved in human intelligence, both at home and abroad. These agencies should report annually to the President and the Congress on their progress in identifying and bringing to justice the buyers and suppliers of weapons of mass destruction, and if significant progress is not being made, their budgets should be increased even further. We will certainly reap a sufficient return on this investment: consider the worldwide implications of just one detonation of a nuclear device in a large American city, not just in lives lost but psychologically and economically as well. It is clear that there are those in the world who are attempting to carry out just such a scenario. We can only hope to stop it with money and international cooperation. It is time to "put our money where our mouth is."

Significantly increased intelligence at home and abroad has implications for democratic freedoms to include personal privacy, freedom of speech, and the right to bear arms. The potential gains, however, significantly outweigh the negative aspects in the context of the current environment. If we are serious about preventing mass deaths at the hands of determined radicals, the United States should take legislative action to loosen wiretapping laws and requirements for warrants, and allow increased search, seizure, detention, and interrogation of suspected criminals as recommended in 1995 by Mr. Netanyahu. 50 Ownership of weapons should be restricted. The right to bear arms as envisioned by our founding fathers was for the purpose of self defense only and should not include legal ownership of automatic weapons and machine guns. We should also continue to review our immigration laws and require more extensive background checks on individuals we allow to enter this country. Many of the terrorists involved with the attacks of 11 September were in this country legally and some were American citizens. The bottom line to all this is that honest, law-abiding citizens will have nothing to fear. Increased legislative review of police actions should also be instituted to safeguard civil liberties, and if police abuses prove to be frequent, the police can be punished and the legislation revised.<sup>51</sup> Also, if it appears at some point in the future that terrorism has subsided to an acceptable level, we can relax the laws at that time. However, if we continue

with the status quo as far as our civil liberties are concerned, we will likely pay the price in terms of many thousands of American lives and billions of dollars.

### CONCLUSION

Osama bin Laden has vowed that terrorism will continue and the U.S. will know no security "...before we live it in Palestine, and not before all the infidel armies leave the land of Muhammad, peace be upon him." This unambiguous statement of the enemy's ends and ways indicates terrorist activity directed at the United States will continue for the foreseeable future. Coercive counterterrorism appears to be the only way to stop extremists. Therefore, we must continue to use all available instruments of national power to defeat global terror networks. We must also aggressively support the legitimate pursuit of a Palestinian homeland, coexisting with Israel, and the eventual withdrawal of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia. This approach serves our goal of stability in the Middle East as well as the desires of most Islamic states. It is also the best way to serve our most enduring national value, democratic freedom, and our most vital national interest, the security of our homeland.

Word Count = 6,140

# **ENDNOTES**

- <sup>1</sup> Sean Anderson and Stephen Sloan, <u>Historical Dictionary of Terrorism</u> (Metuchen, N.J., and London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1995), xxiii.
  - <sup>2</sup> Walter Laqueur, <u>The Age of Terrorism</u> (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1987), 12.
  - <sup>3</sup> Anderson, xxiii.
  - 4 Ibid.
  - <sup>5</sup> Laqueur, 13.
  - <sup>6</sup> Ibid. 11.
  - <sup>7</sup> Anderson, xxiii.
  - <sup>8</sup> Ibid. 21.
  - <sup>9</sup> Ibid. 346.
  - <sup>10</sup> Lisa Beyer, "Roots of Rage," <u>Time Magazine</u>, 1October 2001, 45.
- <sup>11</sup> Andrew Duncan, "Fifty Years On, Israel Still Tied to Circles of Defence Part I," <u>Jane's Intelligence Review</u>, September 1998, 20.
  - <sup>12</sup> Beyer, 46.
  - <sup>13</sup> Ibid.
  - <sup>14</sup> Ibid. 45.
- <sup>15</sup> Stanley Reed et al., "Following the Money: Bin Laden Relies on Accounts Too Small to Track," <u>Business Week</u>, 1 October 2001, 48-49.
- 16 U.S. Department of State, "Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999," April 2000, available from <a href="http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/patterns.pdf">http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/patterns.pdf</a>. Internet; accessed 8 December 2001.
- <sup>17</sup> William J. Clinton, <u>A National Security Strategy for a Global Age</u> (Washington, D.C.: The White house, December 2000), 22-23.
- <sup>18</sup> George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People" (speech presented to the Congress at the United States Capitol and televised live by numerous television networks, 20 September 2001), The White House Office of the Press Secretary; available from < <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html">http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html</a>>. Internet; accessed 11 October 2001.
- <sup>19</sup> U.S. Department of State Bulletin, "No Concessions Policy; Planning and Coordination; and Statistics for 1981 with Special Emphasis on American Targets," August 1982, in <u>Terrorism:</u>

<u>Documents of International and Local Control. Volume IV, A World on Fire</u>, ed. Robert A. Friedlander (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1984), 485.

- <sup>20</sup> U.S. Department of State Bulletin, "Terrorist Skyjackings: A Statistical Overview of Terrorist Skyjackings from January 1968 through June 1982," in <u>Terrorism: Documents of International and Local Control. Volume IV, A World on Fire</u>, ed. Robert A. Friedlander (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1984), 337.
  - <sup>21</sup> Ibid. 340.
  - <sup>22</sup> Ibid, 325.
- <sup>23</sup> U.S. Department of State Bulletin, "No Concessions Policy; Planning and Coordination; and Statistics for 1981 with Special Emphasis on American Targets," 485.
  - <sup>24</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999," 2.
- <sup>25</sup> National Commission on Terrorism, <u>Countering the Changing Threat of International</u> <u>Terrorism</u>, Pursuant to Public Law 277, Report to 105<sup>th</sup> Congress, 21 October 1998. United States Army War College Library June 9, 2000, HV6432.c67 2000, 8-9.
- <sup>26</sup> Bruce Hoffman, "Foreword: Twenty-First Century Terrorism," in <u>The Terrorism Threat and U.S. Government Response; Operational and Organizational Factors</u>, ed. James M. Smith and William C. Thomas (Colorado Springs: United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), vi-vii.
  - <sup>27</sup> Ibid, vi.
- <sup>28</sup> Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, "Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet," in <u>Western Responses to Terrorism</u>, ed. Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1993), 309-311.
  - <sup>29</sup> Ibid., 314.
- Michael McClintock, <u>Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare</u>, <u>Counterinsurgency</u>, <u>Counterterrorism</u>, <u>1940-1990</u> (New York: Pantheon Books, Random House, 1992), xviii.
  - <sup>31</sup> Crelinsten, 316.
- <sup>32</sup> Joshua Sinai, "Ghadaffi's Libya: The Patient Proliferator," <u>Jane's Intelligence Review</u>, December 1998, 30.
- <sup>33</sup> Richard Clutterbuck, "Negotiating with Terrorists," in <u>Western Responses to Terrorism</u>, ed. Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1993), 285.
- <sup>34</sup> Benjamin Netanyahu, <u>Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists</u> (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1995), 72-73.

- <sup>35</sup> Michael Dobbs, "Bin Laden Hails Attacks on Trade Center," <u>Washington Post</u>, 8 October 2001, sec. A, p. 1.
  - <sup>36</sup> Rohan Gunaratna, "Blowback," <u>Jane's Intelligence Review</u>, August 2001, 43-44.
- <sup>37</sup> Stefan Leader, "Osama bin Laden and the Terrorist Search for WMD," <u>Jane's Intelligence</u> <u>Review</u>, June 1999, 37.
  - 38 Ibid.
  - <sup>39</sup> Ibid
- <sup>40</sup> William R. Hawkins, "U.S. Advantage in Asymmetrical Warfare," <u>The Washington Times</u>, 14 November 2001, sec. A, p. 15.
- <sup>41</sup> Sami G. Hajjar, "Avoiding Holy War: Ensuring That the War on Terrorism Is Not Perceived as a War on Islam," (Strategic Issue Analysis Paper in a series titled "Defeating Terrorism," published by the United States Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute), available from <<a href="http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm">http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm</a>>, Internet; accessed 1 February 2002.
  - <sup>42</sup> Ibid.
  - 43 Ibid.
  - 44 Ibid.
- <sup>45</sup> John L. Esposito and R. K. Ramazani, <u>Iran at the Crossroads</u> (New York: PALGRAVE Publishers, 2001), 228-231.
- <sup>46</sup> Elaine Sciolino, "Tehran Aide Assails Terror but Opposes U.S. Attack," <u>New York Times</u>, 1 October 2001, sec. B, p. 3.
- <sup>47</sup> Stephen Biddle, "War Aims and War Termination," (Strategic Issue Analysis Paper in a series titled "Defeating Terrorism," published by the United States Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute), available from <a href="http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm">http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm</a>, Internet; accessed 1 February 2002.
  - 48 Ibid.
  - <sup>49</sup> Netanyahu, 132.
  - <sup>50</sup> Ibid, 140-142.
  - <sup>51</sup> Ibid.
  - <sup>52</sup> Dobbs, sec. A, p. 1.

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